We study two-player (zero-sum) concurrent mean-payoff games played on a finite-state graph. We focus on the important sub-class of ergodic games where all states are visited infinitely often with probability 1. The algorithmic study of ergodic games was initiated in a seminal work of Hoffman and Karp in 1966, but all basic complexity questions have remained unresolved. Our main results for ergodic games are as follows: We establish (1) an optimal exponential bound on the patience of stationary strategies (where patience of a distribution is the inverse of the smallest positive probability and represents a complexity measure of a stationary strategy); (2) the approximation problem lies in FNP; (3) the approximation problem is at least as hard as the decision problem for simple stochastic games (for which NP ∩ coNP is the long-standing best known bound). We present a variant of the strategy-iteration algorithm by Hoffman and Karp; show that both our algorithm and the classical value-iteration algorithm can approximate the value in exponential time; and identify a subclass where the value-iteration algorithm is a FPTAS. We also show that the exact value can be expressed in the existential theory of the reals, and establish square-root sum hardness for a related class of games.
the expectation that Player 1 can guarantee for the limit-average objective against all strategies of Player 2. The games are zero-sum, so the objective of Player 2 is the opposite. The study of concurrent mean-payoff games and its sub-classes have received huge attention over the last decades, both for mathematical results as well as algorithmic studies. Some key celebrated results are as follows: (1) the existence of values (or determinacy or equivalence of switching of strategy quantifiers for the players as in von-Neumann's minmax theorem) for concurrent discounted games was established in [30] ; (2) the result of Blackwell and Ferguson established existence of values for the celebrated game of Big-Match [5] ; and (3) developing on the results of [5] and Bewley and Kohlberg on Puisuex series [4] the existence of values for concurrent mean-payoff games was established by Mertens and Neyman [27] .
Sub-classes.
The general class of concurrent mean-payoff games is notoriously difficult for algorithmic analysis. The current best known solution for general concurrent mean-payoff games is achieved by a reduction to the theory of the reals over addition and multiplication with three quantifier alternations [8] (also see [19] for a better reduction for constant state spaces). The strategies that are required in general for concurrent mean-payoff games are infinite-memory strategies that depend in a complex way on the history of the game [27, 5] , and analysis of such strategies make the algorithmic study complicated. Hence several sub-classes of concurrent mean-payoff games have been studied algorithmically both in terms of restrictions of the graph structure and restrictions of the objective. The three prominent restrictions in terms of the graph structure are as follows: (1) Ergodic games (aka irreducible games) where every state is visited infinitely often almost-surely. (2) Turn-based stochastic games, where in each state at most one player can choose between multiple moves. (3) Deterministic games, where the transition functions are deterministic. The most well-studied restriction in terms of objective is the reachability objectives. A reachability objective consists of a set U of terminal states (absorbing or sink states that are states with only self-loops), such that the set U is exactly the set of states where out-going transitions are assigned reward 1 and all other transitions are assigned reward 0. For all these sub-classes, except deterministic mean-payoff games (that is ergodic mean-payoff games, concurrent reachability games, and turn-based stochastic mean-payoff games) stationary strategies are sufficient, where a stationary strategy is independent of the past history of the game and depends only on the current state. An example. Consider the ergodic mean-payoff game shown in Figure 1 . All transitions other than the dashed edges have probability 1, and each dashed edge has probability 1/2. The transitions are annotated with the rewards. The stationary optimal strategy for both players is to play the first action (a 1 and b 1 for Player 1 and Player 2, respectively) with probability 4 − 2 · √ 3 in state s, and this ensures that the value is √ 3.
Previous results. The decision problem of whether the value of the game at a state is at least a given threshold for turn-based stochastic reachability games (and also turn-based mean-payoff games with deterministic transition function) lie in NP ∩ coNP [9, 33] . They are among the rare and intriguing combinatorial problems that lie in NP ∩ coNP, but not known to be in PTIME. The existence of polynomial-time algorithms for the above decision questions are long-standing open problems. The algorithmic solution for turn-based games that is most efficient in practice is the strategy-iteration algorithm, where the algorithm iterates over local improvement of strategies which is then established to converge to a globally optimal strategy. For ergodic games, Hoffman and Karp [21] presented a strategy-iteration algorithm and also established that stationary strategies are sufficient for such games. For concurrent reachability games, again stationary strategies are sufficient (for ǫ-optimal strategies, for all ǫ > 0) [13, 10] ; the decision problem is in PSPACE and square-root sum hard [11] . 1 Key intriguing complexity questions. There are several key intriguing open questions related to the complexity of the various sub-classes of concurrent mean-payoff games. Some of them are as follows: (1) Does there exist a sub-class of concurrent mean-payoff games where the approximation problem is simpler than the exact decision problem, e.g., the decision problem is square-root sum hard, but the approximation problem can be solved in FNP? (2) There is no convergence result associated with the two classical algorithms, namely the strategy-iteration algorithm of Hoffman and Karp, and the value-iteration algorithm, for ergodic games; and is it possible to establish a convergence for them for approximating the values of ergodic games. ( 3) The complexity of a stationary strategy is described by its patience which is the inverse of the minimum non-zero probability assigned to a move [13] , and there is no bound known for the patience of stationary strategies for ergodic games.
Our results. The study of the ergodic games was initiated in the seminal work of Hoffman and Karp [21] , and most of the complexity questions (related to computational-, strategy-, and algorithmic-complexity) have remained open. In this work we focus on the complexity of simple generalizations of ergodic games (that subsume ergodic games). Ergodic games form a very important sub-class of concurrent games subsuming the special cases of uni-chain Markov decision processes and uni-chain turn-based stochastic games (that have been studied in great depth in the literature with numerous applications, see [15, 28] ). We consider generalizations of ergodic games called sure ergodic games where all plays are guaranteed to reach an ergodic component (a sub-game that is ergodic); and almost-sure ergodic games where with probability 1 an ergodic component is reached. Every ergodic game is sure ergodic, and every sure ergodic game is almost-sure ergodic. Intuitively the generalizations allow us to consider that after a finite prefix an ergodic component is reached.
(Strategy and approximation complexity).
We show that for almost-sure ergodic games the optimal bound on patience required for ǫ-optimal stationary strategies, for ǫ > 0, is exponential (we establish the upper bound for almost-sure ergodic games, and the lower bound for ergodic games). We then show that the approximation problem for turn-based stochastic ergodic mean-payoff games is at least as hard as solving the decision problem for turn-based stochastic reachability games (aka simple stochastic games); and finally show that the approximation problem belongs to FNP for almost-sure ergodic games. Observe that our results imply that improving our FNP-bound for the approximation problem to polynomial time would require solving the long-standing open question of whether the decision problem of turn-based stochastic reachability games can be solved in polynomial time.
(Algorithm).
We present a variant of the Hoffman-Karp algorithm and show that for all ǫ-approximation (for ǫ > 0) our algorithm converges with in exponential number of iterations for almost-sure ergodic games. Again our result is optimal, since even for turn-based stochastic reachability games the strategy-iteration algorithms require exponential iterations [16, 14] . We analyze the value-iteration algorithm for ergodic games and show that for all ǫ > 0, the value-iteration algorithm requires at most O(H · W · ǫ −1 · log(ǫ −1 )) iterations, where H is the upper bound on the expected hitting time of state pairs that Player 1 can ensure and W is the maximal reward value. We show that H is at most n · (δ min ) −n , where n is the number of states of the game, and δ min the smallest positive transition probability. Thus our result establishes an exponential upper bound for the value-iteration algorithm for approximation. This result is in sharp contrast to concurrent reachability games where the value-iteration algorithm requires double exponentially many steps [18] . Observe that we have a polynomial-time approximation scheme if H is polynomial and the numbers W and ǫ are represented in unary. Thus we identify a subclass of ergodic games where the value-iteration algorithm is polynomial (see Remark 19 for further details).
(Exact complexity).
We show that the exact decision problem for almost-sure ergodic games can be expressed in the existential theory of the reals (in contrast to general concurrent mean-payoff games where quantifier alternations are required). Finally, we show that the exact decision problem for sure ergodic games is square-root sum hard.
Technical contribution and remarks. Our main result is establishing the optimal bound of exponential patience for ǫ-optimal stationary strategies, for ǫ > 0, in almost-sure ergodic games. Our result is in sharp contrast to the optimal bound of double-exponential patience for concurrent reachability games [20] , and also the double-exponential iterations required by the strategy-iteration and the value-iteration algorithms for concurrent reachability games [18] . Our upper bound on the exponential patience is achieved by a coupling argument. While coupling argument is a well-established tool in probability theory, to the best of our knowledge the argument has not been used for concurrent mean-payoff games before. Our lower bound example constructs a family of ergodic mean-payoff games where exponential patience is required. Our results provide a complete picture for almost-sure and sure ergodic games (subsuming ergodic games) in terms of strategy complexity, computational complexity, and algorithmic complexity; and present answers to some of the key intriguing open questions related to the computational complexity of concurrent meanpayoff games.
Comparison with results for Shapley games. For Shapley (concurrent discounted) games, the exact decision problem is square-root sum hard [12] , and the fact that the approximation problem is in FNP is straight-forward to prove 2 . The more interesting and challenging question is whether the approximation problem can be solved in PPAD. The PPAD complexity for the approximation problem for Shapley games was established in [12] ; and the PPAD complexity arguments use the existence of unique (Banach) fixpoint (due to contraction mapping) and the fact that weak approximation implies strong approximation. A PPAD complexity result for the class of ergodic games (in particular, whether weak approximation implies strong approximation) is a subject for future work. Another interesting direction of future work would be to extend our results for concurrent games where the values of all states are very close together; and for this class of games existence of near optimal stationary strategies was established in [6] .
Definitions
In this section we present the definitions of game structures, strategies, mean-payoff function, values, and other basic notions.
Probability distributions. For a finite set A, a probability distribution on A is a function δ : A → [0, 1] such that a∈A δ(a) = 1. We denote the set of probability distributions on A by D(A). Given a distribution δ ∈ D(A), we denote by Supp(δ) = {x ∈ A | δ(x) > 0} the support of the distribution δ. We denote by r the number of random states where the transition function is not deterministic, i.e., r = |{s ∈ S | ∃a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s), a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s).|Supp(δ(s, a 1 , a 2 ))| ≥ 2}|.
Concurrent game structures.
A concurrent stochastic game structure G = (S, A, Γ 1 , Γ 2 , δ) has the following components.
• A finite state space S and a finite set A of actions (or moves).
• Two move assignments Γ 1 , Γ 2 : S → 2 A \ ∅. For i ∈ {1, 2}, assignment Γ i associates with each state s ∈ S the non-empty set Γ i (s) ⊆ A of moves available to Player i at state s.
• A probabilistic transition function δ : S ×A×A → D(S), which associates with every state s ∈ S and moves a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s) and a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s), a probability distribution δ(s, a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ D(S) for the successor state. We denote by δ min the minimum non-zero transition probability, i.e., δ min = min s,t∈S min a 1 ∈Γ 1 (s),a 2 ∈Γ 2 (s) {δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )(t) | δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )(t) > 0}. We denote by n the number of states (i.e., n = |S|), and by m the maximal number of actions available for a player at a state (i.e., m = max s∈S max{|Γ 1 (s)|, |Γ 2 (s)|}). We denote by r the number of random states where the transition function is not deterministic, i.e., r = |{s ∈ S | ∃a 1 
Plays. At every state s ∈ S, Player 1 chooses a move a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s), and simultaneously and independently Player 2 chooses a move a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s). The game then proceeds to the successor state t with probability δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )(t), for all t ∈ S. A path or a play of G is an infinite sequence π = (
. . . of states and action pairs such that for all k ≥ 0 we have
We denote by Π the set of all paths. Strategies. A strategy for a player is a recipe that describes how to extend prefixes of a play. Formally, a strategy for Player i ∈ {1, 2} is a mapping σ i : (S × A × A) * × S → D(A) that associates with every finite sequence x ∈ (S × A × A) * of state and action pairs, and the current state s in S, representing the past history of the game, a probability distribution σ i (x · s) used to select the next move. The strategy σ i can prescribe only moves that are available to Player i; that is, for all sequences x ∈ (S × A × A) * and states s ∈ S, we require that Supp(σ i (x · s)) ⊆ Γ i (s). We denote by Σ i the set of all strategies for Player i ∈ {1, 2}. Once the starting state s and the strategies σ 1 and σ 2 for the two players have been chosen, then we have a random walk π σ 1 ,σ 2 s for which the probabilities of events are uniquely defined [32] , where an event A ⊆ Π is a measurable set of paths. For an event A ⊆ Π, we denote by Pr σ 1 ,σ 2 s (A) the probability that a path belongs to A when the game starts from s and the players use the strategies σ 1 and σ 2 ; and denote E σ 1 ,σ 2 s
[·] as the associated expectation measure. We consider in particular stationary and positional strategies. A strategy σ i is stationary (or memoryless) if it is independent of the history but only depends on the current state, i.e., for all x, x ′ ∈ (S × A × A) * and all s ∈ S, we have σ i (x · s) = σ i (x ′ · s), and thus can be expressed as a function σ i : S → D(A). For stationary strategies, the complexity of the strategy is described by the patience of the strategy, which is the inverse of the minimum non-zero probability assigned to an action [13] . Formally, for a stationary strategy
A strategy is pure (deterministic) if it does not use randomization, i.e., for any history there is always some unique action a that is played with probability 1. A pure stationary strategy σ i is also called a positional strategy, and represented as a function σ i : S → A. We call a pair of strategies (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ 1 × Σ 2 a strategy profile. The mean-payoff function. In this work we consider maximizing limit-average (or mean-payoff) functions for Player 1, and the objective of Player 2 is opposite (i.e., the games are zero-sum). We consider concurrent games with a reward function R : S × A × A → [0, 1] that assigns a reward value 0 ≤ R(s, a 1 , a 2 ) ≤ 1 for all s ∈ S, a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s), and a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s). For a path π = (s 0 , a 0 1 , a 0 2 ), (s 1 , a 1 1 , a 1 2 ), . . . , the average for
, and the limit-inferior average (resp. limit-superior average) is defined as follows: LimInfAvg(π) = lim inf T →∞ Avg T (resp. LimSupAvg(π) = lim sup T →∞ Avg T ).
For brevity we denote concurrent games with mean-payoff functions as CMPGs (concurrent mean-payoff games).
Values and ǫ-optimal strategies. Given a CMPG G and a reward function R, the lower value v s (resp. the upper value v s ) at a state s is defined as follows:
The celebrated result of Mertens and Neyman [27] shows that the upper and lower value coincide and gives the value of the game denoted as v s . For ǫ ≥ 0, a strategy σ 1 for Player 1 is ǫ-optimal if we have
An optimal strategy is a 0-optimal strategy.
Game classes. We consider the following special classes of CMPGs. Value and the approximation problem. Given a CMPG G, a state s of G, and a rational threshold λ, the value problem is the decision problem that asks whether v s is at most λ. Given a CMPG G, a state s of G, and a tolerance ǫ > 0, the approximation problem asks to compute an interval of length ǫ such that the value v s lies in the interval. We present the formal definition of the decision version of the approximation problem in Section 3.3. In the following sections we consider the value problem and the approximation problem for almost-sure ergodic, sure ergodic, and ergodic games.
Complexity of Approximation for Almost-sure Ergodic Games
In this section we present three results for almost-sure ergodic games: (1) First we establish (in Section 3.1) an optimal exponential bound on the patience of ǫ-optimal stationary strategies, for all ǫ > 0. (2) Second we show (in Section 3.2) that the approximation problem (even for turn-based stochastic ergodic mean-payoff games) is at least as hard as solving the value problem for SSGs. (3) Finally, we show (in Section 3.3) that the approximation problem lies in FNP.
Strategy complexity
In this section we present results related to ǫ-optimal stationary strategies for almost-sure ergodic CMPGs, that on one hand establishes an optimal exponential bound for patience, and on the other hand is used to establish the complexity of approximation of values in the following subsection. The results of this section is also used in the algorithmic analysis in Section 4. We start with the notion of q-rounded strategies.
The classes of q-rounded distributions and strategies. For q ∈ N, a distribution d over a finite set Z is a q-rounded distribution if for all z ∈ Z we have that d(z) = p q for some number p ∈ N. A stationary strategy σ is a q-rounded strategy, if for all states s the distribution σ(s) is a q-rounded distribution.
Patience. Observe that the patience of a q-rounded strategy is at most q. We show that for almost-sure ergodic CMPGs for all ǫ > 0 there are q-rounded ǫ-optimal strategies, where q is as follows:
This immediately implies an exponential upper bound on the patience. We start with a lemma related to the probability of reaching states that are guaranteed to be reached with positive probability.
Lemma 2.
Given a CMPG G, let s be a state in G, and T be a set of states such that for all strategy profiles the set T is reachable (with positive probability) from s. For all strategy profiles the probability to reach T from s in n steps is at least (δ min ) r (where r is the number of random states).
Proof. The basic idea of the proof is to consider a turn-based deterministic game where one player is Player 1 and Player 2 combined, and the opponent makes the choice for the probabilistic transitions.
(The formal description of the turn-based deterministic game is as follows:
; where for all s ∈ S and a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s) and
and Γ 2 (s) = {⊥}. The transition function is as follows: for all s ∈ S and a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s) and a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s) we have δ(s, (a 1 , a 2 ), ⊥)((s, a 1 , a 2 )) = 1 and δ((s, a 1 , a 2 ), ⊥, t)(t) = 1.) In the turn-based deterministic game, against any strategy of the combined players, there is a positional strategy of the player making the probabilistic choices such that T is reached after being in each state at most once certainly (by positional determinacy for turn-based deterministic reachability games [31] ), as otherwise there would exist a positional strategy profile such that T is never reached. The probability that exactly the choices made by the positional strategy of the probabilistic player in the turn-based deterministic game is executed once in each state in the original game is at least (δ min ) r . Hence the desired result follows.
Variation distance.
We use a coupling argument in our proofs and this requires the definition of variation distance of two probability distributions. Given a finite set Z, and two distributions d 1 and d 2 over Z, the variation distance of the distributions is
Coupling and coupling lemma. Let Z be a finite set. For distributions d 1 and d 2 over the finite set Z, a coupling ω is a distribution over Z × Z, such that for all z ∈ Z we have z ′ ∈Z ω(z, z ′ ) = d 1 (z) and also for all z ′ ∈ Z we have z∈Z ω(z, z ′ ) = d 2 (z ′ ). We only use the second part of coupling lemma [1] which is stated as follows:
• (Coupling lemma). For a pair of distributions d 1 and d 2 , there exists a coupling ω of d 1 and d 2 , such that for a random variable (X, Y ) from the distribution ω, we have that
We now show that in almost-sure ergodic CMPGs strategies that play actions with probabilities "close" to what is played by an optimal strategy also achieve values that are "close" to the values achieved by the optimal strategy.
Lemma 3.
Consider an almost-sure ergodic CMPG and let ǫ > 0 be a real number. Let σ 1 be an optimal stationary strategy for Player 1. Let σ ′ 1 be a stationary strategy for Player 1 s.
for all states s and actions a ∈ Γ 1 (s). Then the strategy σ ′
1 is an ǫ-optimal strategy.
Proof. First observe that we can consider ǫ ≤ 1, because as the rewards are in the interval [0, 1] any strategy is an ǫ-optimal strategy for ǫ ≥ 1. The proof is split up in two parts, and the second part uses the first. The first part is related to plays starting in an ergodic component; and the second part is the other case. In both cases we show that σ ′ 1 guarantees a mean-payoff within ǫ of the mean-payoff guaranteed by σ 1 , thus implying the statement. Let σ 2 be a positional best response strategy against σ ′ 1 . Our proof is based on a novel coupling argument. The precise nature of the coupling argument is different in the two parts, but both use the following: For any state s, it is clear that the variation distance between σ ′ 1 (s) and σ 1 (s) is at most
, by definition of σ ′ 1 (s). For a state s, let d s 1 be the distribution over states defined as follows: for t ∈ S we have d s
. Let s 0 be the start state, and P = π σ 1 ,σ 2 s 0 be the random walk from s 0 , where Player 1 follows σ 1 and Player 2 follows σ 2 . Also let
be the similar defined walk, except that Player 1 follows σ ′ 1 instead of σ 1 . Let X i be the random variable indicating the i-th state of P , and let Y i be the similar defined random variable in P ′ instead of P . The state s 0 is in an ergodic component. Consider first the case where s 0 is part of an ergodic component. Irrespective of the strategy profile, all states of the ergodic component are visited infinitely often almostsurely (by definition of an ergodic component). Hence, we can apply Lemma 2 and obtain that we require at most n · (δ min ) r = ǫ·q 4·n·m steps in expectation to get from one state of the component to any other state of the component. Coupling argument. We now construct a coupling argument. We define the coupling using induction. First observe that X 0 = Y 0 = s 0 (the starting state). For i, j ∈ N, let a i,j ≥ 0 be the smallest number such that X i+1 = Y j+1+a i,j . By the preceding we know that a i,j exists for all i, j with probability 1 and a i,j ≤ ǫ·q 4·n·m in expectation. The coupling is done as follows: (1) (Base case): Couple X 0 and Y 0 . We have
and X i+1 is coupled to Y j+1+a i,j , and we couple X i+2 and
) (using coupling lemma). Notice that all X i are coupled to some Y j almost-surely; and moreover in expectation j i is bounded as follows:
The expression can be understood as follows: consider X i being coupled to Y j . With probability at most m 2·q they differ. In that case X i+1 is coupled to Y j+1+a i,j . Otherwise X i+1 is coupled to Y j+1 . By using our bound on a i,j we get the desired expression. For a state s, let f s (resp. f ′ s ) denote the limit-average frequency of s given σ 1 (resp. σ ′ 1 ) and σ 2 . Then it follows easily that for every state s, we have
. The formal argument is as follows: for every state s, consider the reward function R s that assigns reward 1 to all transitions from s and 0 otherwise; and then it is clear that the difference of the mean-payoffs of P and P ′ is maximized if the mean-payoff of P is 1 under R s and the rewards of the steps of P ′ that are not coupled to P are 0. In that case the mean-payoff of P ′ under R s is at least
)) in expectation and thus the difference between the mean-payoff of P and the mean-payoff of P ′ under R s is at most ǫ 8·n in expectation. The mean-payoff value if Player 1 follows a stationary strategy σ 1 1 and Player 2 follows a stationary strategy σ 1 2 , such that the frequencies of the states encountered is
. Thus the differences in mean-payoff value when Player 1 follows σ 1 (resp. σ ′ 1 ) and Player 2 follows the positional strategy σ 2 , which plays action a s 2 in state s, is
(by the preceding argument) and |σ 1 (s)(
q for all s ∈ S and a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s) (by definition), we have the following inequality
The first inequality uses that R(s, a 1 , a s 2 ) ≤ 1 and the preceding comments on the differences. The second inequality uses that (a) when we sum over σ 1 (s)(a 1 ) for all a 1 , for a fixed s ∈ S, we get 1;
The following equality uses that s∈S f s = 1 since they represent frequencies. Finally since 4·m·n·ǫ −1 ≤ q, ǫ ≤ 1, and n ≥ 1 we have The state s 0 is not in an ergodic component. Now consider the case where the start state s 0 is not part of an ergodic component. We divide the walks P and P ′ into two parts. The part inside some ergodic component and the part outside all ergodic components. If P and P ′ ends up in the same ergodic component, then the mean-payoff differs by at most ǫ 2 in expectation, by the first part. For any pair of strategies the random walk defined from them almost-surely reaches some ergodic component (since we consider almost-sure ergodic CMPGs). Hence, we can apply Lemma 2 and see that we require at most n · (δ min ) r = ǫ·q 4·n·m steps in expectation before we reach an ergodic component. Coupling argument. To find the probability that they end up in the same component we again make a coupling argument. Notice that X 0 = Y 0 = s 0 . We now make the coupling using induction. (1) 
(such a coupling exists by the coupling lemma). (2) (Inductive case): Also, if there is a coupling between X i and Y i and X i = Y i = s i , then also make a coupling between X i+1 and Y i+1 , such that
(such a coupling exists by the coupling lemma). Let ℓ be the smallest number such that X ℓ is some state in an ergodic component. In expectation, ℓ is at most ǫ·q 4·n·m . The probability that
If that is not the case, then P and P ′ do end up in the same ergodic component. In the worst case, the component the walk P ends up in has value 1 and the component that the walk P ′ ends up in (if they differ) has value 0. Therefore, with probability at most ǫ 2 the walk P ′ ends up in an ergodic component of value 0 (and hence has mean-payoff 0); and otherwise it ends up in the same component as P does and thus gets the same mean-payoff as P , except for at most ǫ 2 , as we established in the first part. Thus P ′ must ensure the same mean-payoff as P except for 2ǫ 2 = ǫ. We therefore get that σ ′ 1 is an ǫ-optimal strategy (since σ 1 is optimal).
We show that for every integer q ′ ≥ ℓ, for every distribution over ℓ elements, there exists a q ′ -rounded distribution "close" to it. Together with Lemma 3 it shows the existence of q ′ -rounded ǫ-optimal strategies, for every integer q ′ greater than the q defined in Lemma 3.
Proof. WLOG we consider that ℓ ≥ 2 (since the unique distribution over a singleton set clearly have the desired properties for all integers q ≥ 1). Given distribution d 1 we construct a witness distribution d 2 . There are two cases. Either (i) there is an element z ∈ Z such that
• We first consider case (ii), i.e., there exists no element z such that
Precisely only one such element exists in this case since not all ℓ elements can have probability strictly less than 
q for all z ∈ Z and that d 2 is a q-rounded distribution.
• Now we consider case (i). Let z ℓ be an arbitrary element in Z such that
. . , z ℓ−1 } be an arbitrary ordering of the remaining elements. We now construct d 2 iteratively such that in step k we have assigned probability to {z 1 , . . . , z k }. We establish the following iterative property: in step k we have that
The iteration stops when k = ℓ − 1, and then we assign d 2 (z ℓ ) the probability 1 −
We use the standard convention that the empty sum is 0.
Thus, if the sum
is negative, then we have that
where the first inequality is the iterative property (by induction for k − 1); the second inequality follows because in this case we have
; the final inequality follows since
is not negative, then we have that
using the iterative property (by induction) and the inequalities of ( ‡) as in the previous case. Thus, in either case, we have that
q , establishing the iterative property by induction.
Finally we need to consider z ℓ . First, we show that
q , by our iterative property. This also ensures that 
Proof. Notice that the q defined here is the same q as is defined in Lemma 3. Let the integer q ′ ≥ q be given. Consider an almost-sure ergodic CMPG G
Exponential lower bound on patience. We now present a family of ergodic CMPGs where the lower bound on patience is exponential in r. We present the lower bound on a special class of ergodic CMPGs, namely, skew-symmetric ergodic CMPGs which we define below.
Skew-symmetric CMPGs.
A CMPG G is skew-symmetric 3 , if there is a bijective map f : S → S, where f (f (s)) = s, (for all s we use s to denote f (s)) where the following holds: For each state s, there is a bijective map f s 1 : Γ 1 (s) → Γ 2 (s) (for all i ∈ Γ 1 (s) we use i to denote f s 1 (i)) and a bijective map f s 2 : Γ 2 (s) → Γ 1 (s) (similarly to the first map, for all j ∈ Γ 2 (s) we use j to denote f s 2 (j)), such that for all i ∈ Γ 1 (s) and all j ∈ Γ 2 (s), the following conditions hold: (1) we have R(s, i, j) = 1 − R(s, j, i); (2) for all s ′ such that δ(s, i, j)(s ′ ) > 0, we have δ(s, j, i)(s ′ ) = δ(s, i, j)(s ′ ); and (3) we have f s 2 (f s 1 (i)) = i and that f s 1 (f s 2 (j)) = j.
Lemma 6. Consider a skew-symmetric CMPG G. Then for all s we have
Proof. Let s be a state. For a stationary strategy σ k for Player k, k ∈ {1, 2}, let σ k be a stationary strategy for the other player defined as follows: For each state s and action i ∈ Γ k (s), let σ k (s)(i) = σ k (s)(i). For a stationary strategy σ 1 for Player 1, consider the stationary strategy profile (σ 1 , σ 1 ). For the random walk P = π
, where the players follows (σ 1 , σ 1 ), starting in s corresponds to the random walk P = π
, where the players follows (σ 1 , σ 1 ), starting in s, in the obvious way (that is: if P is in state s i in the i-th step and the reward is λ, then P ′ is in s i , in the i-th step and the reward is 1 − λ). The two random walks, P and P ′ , are equally likely. This implies that v s = 1 − v s . Family G k η . We now provide a lower bound for patience of ǫ-optimal strategies in skew-symmetric ergodic CMPGs. More precisely, we give a family of games {G k η | k ≥ 2 ∨ 0 < η < 1 4·k+4 }, such that G k η consists of 2·k +5 states and such that δ min for G k η is η. The game G k η is such that all 1 48 -optimal stationary strategies require patience at least
Corollary 7. For all skew-symmetric ergodic CMPGs the value is
Construction of the family G k η . For a given k ≥ 2 and η, such that 0 < η < 
For y ≥ 2 we have that s y (resp. s y ) has a transition to s k (resp. s k ) of probability 1 − η; to s y−1 (resp. s y−1 ), where s 0 = s 0 = a, with probability η; and also the reward of the transition is 0 (resp. 1). The state b (resp. b) is deterministic and has a transition to a of reward 0 (resp. 1). The transition function at state c is deterministic, and thus for each pair (i, j) of actions we define the unique successor of c.
For
2 ) the successor is s k . The reward of the transitions from c is 1. There is a transition from a to each other state. The probability to go to c and the probability to go to c are both , c and a) , the probability to go to s ′ from a is 
Lemma 9.
For any given k and η, such that 0 < η < 
Then the strategy σ * 1 ensures the maximal value among all strategies in C p . Proof. First, observe that from s k , the probability to reach a in k steps is η k . If a is not reached in k steps, then in these k steps s k is reached again. Similarly for s k . Thus, the expected length L s k of a run from s k (or s k ) to a, is (strictly) more than η −k , but (strictly) less 4 
The proof is split in three parts. The first part considers strategies in C p that plays i c 2 with probability greater than p; the second part considers strategies in C p that plays i c 2 with probability 0; and the third part shows that the optimal distribution for the actions in c is to play as σ * 1 . 4 It is also less than 2 · η −k + k, since for any state si, for i ≥ 1, there is a probability of more than 1 2 to go to s k and whenever the play is in s k there is a probability of η k that it is the last time.
1. Consider some stationary strategy σ ′ 1 ∈ C p such that σ ′ 1 (c)(i c 2 ) = p ′ > p. Consider the strategy σ 1 such that σ 1 (c) = σ * 1 (c) and σ 1 (c) = σ ′ 1 (c). We show that σ 1 guarantees a higher expected meanpayoff value for the run between a and c than σ ′ 1 , and thus σ 1 ensures greater mean-payoff value than σ ′ 1 . For ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, let σ ℓ 2 be an arbitrary stationary strategy which plays j c ℓ with probability 1. Let m ℓ be the mean-payoff of the run from c to a, when Player 1 plays σ * 1 and Player 2 plays σ ℓ 2 . Define m ′ ℓ similarly, except that Player 1 plays σ ′ 1 instead of σ * 1 . Then,
(the expected length of the run is p ′ · (L s k + 1) + (1 − p ′ ) · 2 and it gets reward 1 only once and only with probability 1 − p ′ ). We now argue that m 1 > m ′ 1 . Consider m 1 − m ′ 1 :
Hence, see that the numerator of the above expression is
and therefore m 1 > m ′ 1 . We now argue that m 1 < m 2 and m ′ 1 < m ′ 2 (and thus Player 2 plays j c 1 in c against both σ 1 (and thus also σ * 1 ) and σ ′ 1 ). We have that m 2 = p 2 and (repeated for convenience)
, and hence we have the desired result.
2. Consider some stationary strategy σ 0 1 ∈ C p such that σ 0 1 (c)(i c 2 ) = 0. Now consider the strategy σ 1 such that σ 1 (c) = σ * 1 (c) and σ 1 (c) = σ 0 1 (c). Then, the best response σ 0 2 for Player 2 against σ 0 1 plays j c 2 with probability 1. We see that if Player 1 follows σ 0 1 and Player 2 follows σ 0 2 , then the mean-payoff of the run from c to a is 0. Thus σ 1 ensures greater mean-payoff value than σ 0 1 .
3. Similar to the first two parts, it follows that a strategy that plays like σ * 1 in c ensures at least the meanpayoff value of any other stationary strategy in C p for the play between c and a. (In this case, the best response for Player 2 plays j c 1 with probability 1 and therefore the mean-payoff for the run from c to a is 2−p 2 as the length of the run is 2; and with probability 1 − p both rewards are 1, otherwise the first reward is 1 and the second reward is 0). It follows from above that σ * 1 ensures the maximal mean-payoff value among all strategies in C p .
Lemma 10.
For any given k and η, such that 0 < η < Proof. By Lemma 9 we only need to consider σ * 1 as defined in Lemma 9. Now we calculate the expected mean-payoff value for a run from a to a given σ * 1 and a positional best-response strategy σ 2 for Player 2, (which is then the expected mean-payoff value of the strategies in G k η ) as follows:
1. With probability 1 2 in the first step, the run goes to some state which is neither c nor c. Since the probability is equally large to go to some state s or to the corresponding skew-symmetric state s and no state s can be reached such that |Γ 1 (s)| or |Γ 2 (s)| is more than 1, such runs has mean-payoff 2. Otherwise with probability 1 2 in the first step we get reward 1 2 and go to either c or c with equal probability (that is: the probability to go to c or c is 1 4 each). As shown in Lemma 9, (i) the length of the run from c to a is 2; and with probability 1 − p both rewards are 1, otherwise the first reward is 1 and the second reward is 0; (ii) the expected length of the run from c to a is p · (L s k + 1) + (1 − p) · 2 and it gets reward 1 only once and only with probability 1 − p (where L s k is as defined in Lemma 9).
From the above case analysis we conclude that the mean-payoff of the run from a to a is
In the first inequality we use that 1 + p · (L s k + 1) + (1 − p) · 2 > p · L s k and that p > 0. In the second inequality we use that p = 2 · η k/2 and that η −k < L s k . In the third we use that η −k/2 > 12, which comes from k ≥ 2 and η < 
in the game G k η .
Theorem 11 (Strategy complexity).
The following assertions hold:
(Upper bound).
For almost-sure ergodic CMPGs, for all ǫ > 0, there exists an ǫ-optimal strategy of patience at most
(Lower bound).
There exists a family of ergodic CMPGs G δ min n , for each odd n ≥ 9 and 0 < δ min < 1 2·n and n = r + 5, such that any , the skew-symmetric ergodic game G k η , except that the transitions from a are not drawn. There is a transition from a to each other state. The probability to go to c from a and the probability to go to c from a are both 
Hardness of approximation
We present a polynomial reduction from the value problem for SSGs to the problem of approximation of values for turn-based stochastic ergodic mean-payoff games (TEMPGs). The reduction. Consider an SSG G with n non-terminal states, and two terminal states (⊤ and ⊥). Given a state s in G we construct a TEMPG G ′ = Red(G, s) that has the same states as G (including the terminal states) and one additional state s ′ . For every transition in G, there is a corresponding transition in G ′ , with reward 0. The 1 terminal ⊤ (resp. 0 terminal ⊥) instead of the self-loop, has two outgoing transitions that go to ⊤ (resp. ⊥) with probability 1 − 1 2 9n and to s ′ with probability 1 2 9n . The reward of the transitions are 1 (resp. 0) for ⊤ (resp. ⊥). The additional state s ′ goes to s with probability 1 − 1 2 7n and to each other state (including the terminals, but not s and s ′ ) with probability 1 (n+1)·2 7n . The rewards of the transitions from s ′ are 0. We first observe that the game G ′ is ergodic: since the SSG G is stopping, from all states and for all strategies in G, the terminal states are reached with probability 1; and hence in G ′ , from all states and for all strategies, the state s ′ is reached with probability 1; and from s ′ there exists a positive transition probability to every state other than s ′ . It follows that under all strategy profiles, from all starting states, the state s ′ is visited infinitely often almost-surely, and hence every other state is visited infinitely often almost-surely. Hence G ′ is ergodic. We now show that the value v of G ′ is "close" to the value v s of s in G. We then argue that we can obtain v s from v in polynomial time by rounding. Proof. We show that the value of G ′ is at least v s − 2 −7n+1 ; and the other part of the proof is symmetric. Notice that since G is stopping, we reach a terminal in n steps with probability at least 1 2 n , from every starting state. The expected number of steps required to reach the terminal states is at most n · 2 n (one can also use a more refined argument similar to [23] to show that the expected number of steps is at most 2 n+1 ). By construction this is also the case in G ′ . From a terminal state in G ′ the expected number of steps required to reach s ′ is 2 9n . Consider an optimal strategy σ 1 in G for Player 1. Since G and G ′ have the same set of states where Player 1 has a choice (and the same choices in those states), we can also use σ 1 in G ′ . Now consider the best response strategy σ 2 against σ 1 for Player 2 in G ′ . We now estimate the value of G ′ . The best σ 2 can ensure for Player 2 is the following:
• By the argument above, for the plays from any starting state in G, the expected number of steps required to reach a terminal state is (at most) n · 2 n .
• For a state t different from s, the plays from t reach the 0 terminal with probability 1.
• The plays from s reach the 0 terminal with probability 1 − v s and the 1 terminal with probability v s .
Notice that for plays starting from any state t = s ′ , the expected number of steps to reach s ′ is at most n · 2 n + 2 9n . Hence the expected number of steps required to reach s ′ again from itself is at most n · 2 n + 2 9n + 1. We now argue that the mean-payoff value is at least v s − 2 −7n+1 . With probability 1 − 1 2 7n , the successor of s ′ is s. From s the play reaches s ′ after being in the 1 terminal for v s · 2 9n steps in expectation. Each reward obtained in the 1 terminal is 1. All remaining rewards are 0. Hence, the mean-payoff value is at least
The first inequality comes from n · 2 n = 2 n+log n < 2 2n ; the second inequality comes from
; and the last inequality comes from v s ≤ 1. Using a similar argument for Player 2, we obtain that the mean-payoff value is at most v s + 2 −7n+1 , by using that the expected path-length from a state t in G to a terminal is at least 0. Therefore v, the value of
Observe that if the value v of G ′ can be approximated within 2 −6n , then Lemma 12 implies that the approximation a is in
As observed by Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen [23] , if the value of a state of an SSG can be approximated from below within 2 −4n , then one can use the KwekMehlhorn algorithm [25] to round the approximated value to obtain the correct value, in polynomial time. We therefore get the following lemma.
Lemma 13. The problem of finding the value of a state in an SSG is polynomial time Turing reducible to the problem of approximating the value of a TEMPG (turn-based stochastic ergodic mean-payoff game) within
2 −6n .
Approximation complexity
In this section we establish the approximation complexity for almost-sure ergodic CMPGs. We first recall the definition of the decision problem for approximation. Approximation decision problem. Given an almost-sure ergodic CMPG G (with rational transition probabilities given in binary), a state s, an ǫ > 0 (in binary), and a rational number λ (in binary), the promise problem PROMVALERG (i) accepts if the value of s is at least λ, (ii) rejects if the value of s is at most λ − ǫ, and (iii) if the value is in the interval (λ − ǫ; λ), then it may both accept or reject.
Theorem 14 (Approximation complexity).
For almost-sure ergodic CMPGs, the following assertions hold:
(Upper bound). The problem PROMVALERG is in FNP.

(Hardness). The problem of finding the value of a state in an SSG is polynomial time Turing reducible
to the problem PROMVALERG, even for the special case of turn-based stochastic ergodic mean-payoff games (TEMPGs).
Proof. We present the proof for both the items.
1. We first present an FNP algorithm for PROMVALERG as follows: Guess an ǫ 4 -optimal, q ′ -rounded strategy σ 1 for Player 1, where q ′ = ⌈q⌉ such that q is as in Corollary 5 (also such a strategy exists by Corollary 5). The strategy is then described using at most O(n · m · log q ′ ) many bits. Since ǫ and δ min is given in binary, log q ′ uses at most polynomial many bits. Now compute the best response strategy for Player 2. Since σ 1 is a stationary strategy (because it is q ′ -rounded), when Player 1 restricted to follow σ 1 , the game becomes an MDP for Player 2, and the size of the MDP is also polynomial in the size of G and log q ′ . Hence there exists a positional best response strategy σ 2 , which we can find in polynomial time using linear programming [15, 28, 24] . When Player 1 follows σ 1 and Player 2 follows σ 2 some expected mean-payoff val is achieved. Similarly guess an 2. We now show that the problem of finding the value of a state in an SSG is polynomial time Turing reducible to the problem PROMVALERG for TEMPGs. By Lemma 13, we just need to approximate the value v of a TEMPG G within 2 −6n . For any number 0 < a < 1 and integer b, let Proc b be a procedure, that takes We argue how to use the Kwek-Mehlhorn algorithm [25] to find the value of G within 2 −6n using polynomially many calls to PROMVALERG. Let b be 2 8n . Let Proc b be PROMVALERG with ǫ = 2 −16n . Notice that the choice of ǫ ensures that there can be at most one pair p, q such that
, because all such numbers are at least 2 −16n apart. On such an input PROMVALERG answers arbitrarily, but on all other inputs it accurately answers if p q ≥ v. The Kwek-Mehlhorn algorithm queries a pair of variables only once, and finds a fraction p q such that 0 ≤ p ≤ q ≤ 2 8n . But the four best such fractions must be within 2 −6n of v.
The desired result follows.
Strategy-iteration Algorithm for Almost-sure Ergodic CMPGs
The classic algorithm for solving ergodic CMPGs was given by Hoffman and Karp [21] . We present a variant of the algorithm, and show that for every ǫ > 0 it runs in exponential time for ǫ approximation. Also observe that even for the value problem for SSGs the strategy-iteration algorithms require exponential time [16, 14] , and hence our exponential upper bound is optimal (given our reduction of the value problem of SSGs to the approximation problem for TEMPGs).
The variant of Hoffman-Karp algorithm. For an almost-sure ergodic CMPG G, an ǫ > 0, and a state t, we present an algorithm to compute a q-rounded ǫ-optimal strategy in O(q n·m ) iterations, and each iteration requires O 2 POLY(m) · POLY(n, log(ǫ −1 ), log(δ −1 min )) time, where
Note that in all typical cases, n is large and m is constant, and every iteration takes polynomial time if m is constant. The basic informal description of the algorithm is as follows. In every iteration i, the algorithm considers a q-rounded strategy σ i 1 , and then improves the strategy locally as follows: first it computes the potential v
1 as in the Hoffman-Karp algorithm, and then for every state s, the algorithm locally computes the best q-rounded distribution at s to improve the potential. The intuitive description of the potential is as follows: Fix the specific state t as a target state (where the potential must be 0); and given a stationary strategy σ, consider a modified reward function that assigns the original reward minus the value ensured by σ. Then the potential for every state s other than the specified state t is the expected sum of rewards under the modified reward function for the random walk from s to t. The local improvement step is achieved by playing a matrix game with potentials. Our variant differs from the Hoffman-Karp algorithm that while solving the matrix game we restrict Player 1 to only q-rounded distributions. The formal description of the algorithm is given in Figure 3 , and the formal definition of the expected one-step reward
Computation of every iteration. The computation of every iteration is as follows. The computation of the unique solution g i and (v i s ) s∈S is obtained in polynomial time using linear programming. The fact that the solution is unique follows from the fact that once a strategy for Player 1 is fixed, we obtain an MDP for Player 2, and then the MDP solution is unique. For a state s, let D q (s) denote the set of all q-rounded distributions over
The computation of a best q-rounded strategy is achieved as follows: given an (m 1 × m 2 )-matrix game M , solve the following integer linear program for
Compute g i , (v i s ) s∈S as the unique solution of
for (s ∈ S) do Let M s be the matrix game defined as follows:
Let σ i 1 (s) be an arbitrary best q-rounded distribution over Γ 1 (s) for the matrix game M s ; 
where ℓ is the gcd of all the entries of M . It was shown by Lenstra [26] , that any integer linear programming problem on an integer (m 1 × m 2 )-matrix (that is, with m 1 variables) can be solved in time 2 POLY(m 1 ) · POLY(m 2 , log a), where a is an upper bound on the greatest integer in the matrix and associated vectors. Notice that we can simply scale our matrix with q · ℓ and obtain our optimization problem in the required form. Since the entries in the original game was defined from a solution to an MDP (which can be represented using polynomially many bits, because the Player-1 strategy is q-rounded), we know that only polynomially many bits are needed to represent M s (also after scaling). Thus, such an integer linear programming problem can be solved in time O(2 POLY(m) · POLY(n, log(ǫ −1 ), log(δ δ(s, d 1 , a 2 ) , and the reward is given by ExpRew(s, d 1 , a 2 ) . Given a q-rounded strategy σ 1 for Player 1 in G and a positional strategy σ 2 , if we interpret the strategies in G ′ , then the mean-payoff value in G ′ is exactly half of the mean-payoff value in G.
Correctness analysis and bound on iterations. We now present the correctness analysis, and the bound on the number of iterations follows. The classic strategy-iteration algorithm computes the same series of strategies for Player 1 on TB(G) as our modified Hoffman-Karp algorithm does on the original game 5 . This is because, if we consider a fixed strategy for Player 1 in TB(G) and the corresponding strategy in G, then the best response positional strategy for Player 2 in TB(G) and G resp. must correspond to each other. Then, by the way the potentials are calculated by the two algorithms, we get the same potential for a given state s ∈ S for Player 1 in TB(G) as we do for the corresponding state in G (they are precisely the same, since the value in TB(G), for any given strategy profile, is half the value of G, and thus, when we have taken two steps in TB(G) we have subtracted precisely the value of G). Thus, also the next strategy for Player 1 is the same. Thus, since the turn-based algorithm correctly finds the optimal strategy for Player 1, our modified Hoffman-Karp algorithm also correctly finds the q-rounded strategy that guarantees the highest value in G for all states, among all q-rounded strategies. Since the best q-rounded strategy in G is ǫ-optimal for G (by Corollary 5), we have thus found an ǫ-optimal strategy. It is well known that the classic strategy-iteration algorithm only considers each strategy for Player 1 once (because the potential of the strategies picked by Player 1 are monotonically increasing in every iteration of the loop) . Therefore our VarHoffmanKarp algorithm requires at most q m·n iterations, since there are most q m·n strategies that are q-rounded.
Inefficiency in reduction to TB(G).
Observe that we only use TB(G) for the correctness analysis, and do not explicitly construct TB(G) in our algorithm. Constructing TB(G) and then solving TB(G) using strategy iteration could also be used to compute ǫ-optimal q-rounded strategies. However, as compared to our algorithm there are two drawbacks in constructing TB(G) explicitly. First, then every iteration would take time polynomial in q (which is exponential in n), whereas every iteration of our algorithm requires only polynomial time in n and log q. Second, our algorithm only requires polynomial space, whereas the construction of TB(G) would require space polynomial in q (which is exponential in the input size). 5 The proof that the strategy-iteration algorithm works for turn-based mean-payoff games seems to be folk-lore, and also see [29] for the related class of discounted games. Moreover, though TB(G) is not almost-sure ergodic, if we consider an ergodic component C in G, and consider the corresponding set of states in TB(G), then from all states in C every other state in C is visited infinitely often with probability 1 in TB(G). Thus for the concrete game TB(G), the proof can also be done similarly to the proof by Hoffman and Karp [21] for ergodic games, by picking t as a state in C in TB(G).
Analysis of the Value-iteration Algorithm
In this section we show that the classical value-iteration algorithm requires at most exponentially many steps to approximate the value of ergodic concurrent mean-payoff games (ECMPGs). We first start with a few notations and a basic lemma. Notations. Given an ECMPG G, let v * denote the value of the game (recall that all states in an ECMPG have the same value). Let v T s = sup
[Avg T ] denote the value function for the objective Avg T , i.e., playing the game for T steps. For an ECMPG G we call the game with the objective Avg T as G T . A Markov strategy only depends on the length of the play and the current state. A strategy σ 1 is optimal for the objective
, and a strategy σ 2 is optimal for the objective
For the objective Avg T , optimal Markov strategies exist for both the players. The function v T s is computed iteratively in T : initially v 0 s = 0 for all s, and in every iteration j ≥ 1 compute the following one-step operator for all s: consider a matrix M j s such that for all a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s) and a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s) we have
and then obtain v j s as the solution of the matrix games, i.e.,
The above algorithm is refered to as the value-iteration algorithm. It is well-known that v s = lim inf T →∞ v T s = lim sup T →∞ v T s [27] , i.e., the value of the finite-horizon games converge to the value of the game. We first establish a result that shows that for all T there exist s and s ′ such that v * is bounded by v T s and v T s ′ . Lemma 16. For all ECMPGs G and for all T > 0, there exists a pair of states
Proof overview:
The proof is by contradiction, that is, we assume that for all s we have v T s < v * (the other case follows from the same game where the players have exchanged roles). The idea is that we can consider plays of G, defined by an optimal strategy for the objective LimInfAvg for Player 1 in G and a Markov strategy for Player 2 that plays an optimal Markov strategy for objective Avg T in G T for T steps and then starts over. We then split the plays into sub-plays of length T . Since for all s we have v T s < v * and because Player 2 plays optimally in the sub-plays, in every segment of length T the expected mean-payoff is strictly less than v * . But then also the expected mean-payoff of the plays is strictly less than v * . This contradicts that Player 1 played optimally (which ensures that the expected mean-payoff is at least v * ). We now present the formal proof of the lemma.
Proof. We argue explicitly about v * ≤ v T s and the other inequality follows by considering the same game, but where the players have exchanged roles. Assume towards contradition that there exists an ECMPG G, a time-bound T > 0, and an ǫ > 0, such that for all s we have v * ≥ v T s + ǫ. Let σ ′ 2 be an optimal Markov strategy for Avg T in the finite-horizion game G T , and let σ 2 be the Markov strategy in G defined as follows: for plays of length T ′ with last state s ′ we have σ 2 (T ′ , s ′ ) = σ ′ 2 (T ′ mod T, s ′ ), for all T ′ ≥ 0 and states s ′ . Let σ 1 be an ǫ/4-optimal strategy for the objective LimInfAvg for Player 1. Then for all s we have
where we used that σ 1 is ǫ/4-optimal in the first inequality and Fatou's lemma in the second inequality. Let T ′ be such that E 
where the first equality is expanding the definition of Avg T ; the second equality is obtained by splitting the sum into sub-sums of length T ; and the third equality is by linearity of expectation. For any j, the number
is at most v T s j·T , because σ 2 in round i + j · T , for 0 ≤ i < T , played as σ ′ 2 (i, s ′ ) which is optimal for Avg T in G T (note that c j would be precisely v T s j·T if also σ 1 in round i + j · T , for 0 ≤ i < T , played as an optimal strategy for Avg T in G T , by definition of the value in G T ). Note that by the assumption (towards contradiction) we have v T s j·T ≤ v * − ǫ, and hence c j ≤ v * − ǫ. Therefore,
which is a contradiction. The desired result follows.
Note that the proof of the above lemma does not require that the game is ergodic. The lemma is easily extended to general CMPGs by considering s in the proof to be the state of the highest value v s .
The numbers H and H. Given an ECMPG G, strategies σ 1 and σ 2 for the players, and two states s and t, let H σ 1 ,σ 2 s,t denote the expected hitting time from s to t, given the strategies. Let
; and H = inf σ 1 ∈Σ 1 H σ 1 and H = sup σ 1 ∈Σ 1 H σ 1 . Intuitively, H is the minimum expected hitting time between all state pairs that Player 1 can ensure against all strategies of Player 2.
Lemma 17. For all ECMPGs
Proof. Since G is ergodic for all strategy profiles and for all state pairs s and t, the state t is reached from s with positive probability (by definition of ergodicity). Hence the desired result follows from Lemma 2.
We now present our main result for the bounds required for approximation by the value-iteration algorithm.
Theorem 18. For all ECMPGs, for all 0 < ǫ < 1, and all T ≥ 4 · H · c · log c, for c = 2 · ǫ −1 , we have that
Value problem in existential theory of the reals
We show how to express the value problem for almost-sure ergodic CMPGs in the existential theory of the reals (with addition and multiplication) in three steps (for details about the existential theory of the reals see [7, 3] ). In the general case of CMPGs the current known solution for the value problem in the theory of reals uses three quantifier alternations [8] , and in the theory of reals one of the computationally expensive step is the quantifier alternation elimination.
Step 1: Ergodic decomposition computation. First we compute the ergodic decomposition of an almost-sure ergodic CMPG in polynomial time, and let C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C ℓ , be the ℓ ergodic components. The polynomial time algorithm is as follows: construct a graph with state space S, and put an edge (s, t) iff t is reachable from s in the CMPG. The bottom scc's of the graph are the ergodic components, where a bottom scc is an scc with no out-going edges leaving the scc.
Step 2: Existential theory of the reals sentence for an ergodic component. For an ergodic CMPG G, Hoffman-Karp [21] shows that the value is the unique fixpoint of the strategy-iteration algorithm. The algorithm iteratively takes a strategy σ 1 for Player 1, computes the optimal best response strategy σ 2 for Player 2, and computes the potentials of each state v σ 1 s and the value g σ 1 guaranteed by σ 1 . A strategy for Player 1 that ensures a higher value than g σ 1 is then, for every state u, to use an optimal distribution in the matrix game defined by
s . We quantify over stationary strategies in the existential theory of the reals, and use the following notation: for a set {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k } of variables we write ProbDist(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) to denote the constraints (i)
The preceding equality together with (v s * = 0) ensures that (v s ) s∈S is the potential associated with the stationary strategy x, and hence, g is the value of the game. The sentence Φ in the existential theory of the reals for the value is
and g denotes the value of the component.
Step 3: Existential theory of the reals sentence for an almost-sure ergodic CMPG. Given a real number λ and an almost-sure ergodic CMPG G, we now give an existential theory of the reals sentence, which can be satisfied iff G has value at most λ. Let C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C ℓ be the ergodic components, and let C = ℓ i=1 C i . We denote by Φ C i the existential theory of the reals sentence for the value in component C i (as described in Step 2) and the variable g i is the value. The existential theory sentence for other states is given using the formula for reachability games. We quantify existential over the variables ((z s ) s∈S , (x i,s ) s∈(S\C),i∈Γ 1 (s) , (y s,j ) s∈(S\C),j∈Γ 2 (s) ) and have the following constraints:
(z s ≤ i∈Γ 1 (s) t∈S x s,i · δ(s, i, j)(t) · z t ) ∧ 
The idea is as follows: First note that the constraint z s = g i , for s ∈ C, ensures that for all states in the ergodic component the variable z s denotes the value of s (by the correctness of the formula Φ C i for an ergodic component C i ). If the value of state s ∈ (S \ C) in G is z s , for all s, then s∈(S\C) j∈Γ 2 (s) (z s ≤ i∈Γ 1 (s) t∈S x s,i · δ(s, i, j)(t) · z t )
ensures that x is an optimal strategy in the game. Also, similar to the ergodic part, x s,i · δ(s, i, j)(t) · z t ) .
Therefore, the vectorz, such thatz s = z s is a fixpoint for the value-iteration algorithm for reachability objectives. Hence, the fact that z s ≤ λ, implies that the least fixpointz of the value-iteration algorithm (which is the value of the game) is such thatz s ≤ λ. Thus, we get the following theorem. 
Square-root sum hardness
In this section we show that the value problem for sure ergodic CMPGs is at least as hard as the square-root sum problem by generalizing the example we presented in Figure 1 . Square-root sum problem. The square-root sum problem is the following decision problem: Given a positive integer v and a set of positive integers {n 1 , . . . , n ℓ }, is
√ n i ≥ v? The problem is known to be in the the fourth level of the counting hierarchy [2] , but it is a long-standing open problem if it is in NP. Reduction to sure ergodic CMPGs. The reduction is similar to [11, 12] . First we define a family of ergodic CMPGs {G b | b ∈ N}, such that G b has value √ b. Given an instance of the square-root sum problem, (v, {n 1 , . . . , n ℓ }), we use our family to get an ergodic CMPG G n i for each number n i . We use one more state s * , with one action for each player. The successor of s * is G n i with probability < 1, and thus there is a positive probability to change to the other state in every step, no matter the choice of the players. There is an illustration of G b in Figure 4 . 
Conclusion
In this work we established the strategy complexity and the approximation complexity for ergodic, sure ergodic, and almost-sure ergodic mean-payoff games. Our results also show that the approximation problem for turn-based stochastic ergodic mean-payoff games is at least as hard as the value problem for SSGs. In contrast, for concurrent deterministic almost-sure ergodic games, the value problem can be solved in polynomial time. In concurrent deterministic games, in every ergodic component all states have an unique successor, and hence an optimal strategy and the value can be computed in polynomial time. In any given concurrent deterministic almost-sure ergodic game, once the values of the ergodic components have been computed, the value iteration algorithm computes the values for the remaining states in n iterations. Moreover, we established that the value problem for sure ergodic games is square-root sum hard. Note that for sure ergodic games with reachability objectives, the values can be computed in polynomial time by value iteration for n iterations. This shows informally that the hardness of sure ergodic games is due to meanpayoff objectives. Since we have shown that values of ergodic games can be irrational, we conjecture that the value problem for ergodic games itself is sqaure-root sum hard, but an explicit reduction is likely to be cumbersome.
